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ABSTRACT
Some anonymity schemes might in principle protect users
from pervasive network surveillance—but only if all mes-
sages are independent and unlinkable. Users in practice often
need pseudonymity—sending messages intentionally linkable
to each other but not to the sender—but pseudonymity in
dynamic networks exposes users to intersection attacks. We
present Buddies, the first systematic design for intersec-
tion attack resistance in practical anonymity systems. Bud-
dies groups users dynamically into buddy sets, controlling
message transmission to make buddies within a set behav-
iorally indistinguishable under traffic analysis. To manage
the inevitable tradeoffs between anonymity guarantees and
communication responsiveness, Buddies enables users to se-
lect independent attack mitigation policies for each pseu-
donym. Using trace-based simulations and a working pro-
totype, we find that Buddies can guarantee non-trivial an-
onymity set sizes in realistic chat/microblogging scenarios,
for both short-lived and long-lived pseudonyms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection
Keywords
anonymity; pseudonymity; intersection; disclosure
1. INTRODUCTION
Some anonymous communication techniques promise se-
curity even against powerful adversaries capable of pervasive
network traffic analysis—provided all messages are fully in-
dependent of each other and/or the set of participants never
changes [5,9,41,52]. Practical systems, however, must toler-
ate churn in the set of online users, and must support ongo-
ing exchanges that make messages linkable over time, as with
Mixminion nyms [15] or Tor sessions [18]. By sending link-
able messages in the presence of churn, however, users can
quickly lose anonymity to statistical disclosure or intersec-
tion attacks [16, 31, 42, 53]. Though this extensively studied
attack vector could apply in almost any realistic anonymous
communication scenario, no practical anonymity system we
know of offers active protection against such attacks.
As an example intended merely to illustrate one possible
scenario in this broad class of attacks, suppose Alice writes
a blog under a pseudonym to expose corruption in her local
city government. Alice always connects to the blog server
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via Tor [18], and never reveals personally identifying infor-
mation on her blog or to the server. Carol, a corrupt city
official mentioned in Alice’s blog, deduces from the blog’s
content that its owner is local, and calls her friend Mallory,
a network administrator in the monopolistic local ISP. Mal-
lory cannot directly compromise Tor, but she reads from Al-
ice’s blog the date and time each blog entry was posted, and
she learns from the ISP’s access logs which customers were
online and actively communicating at each of those times.
While thousands of customers may be online at each post-
ing time, every customer except Alice has a chance of being
offline during some posting time, and this chance exponen-
tially approaches certainty as Alice continues posting. Mal-
lory simply keeps monitoring until the intersection of these
online user sets narrows to one user, Alice. We don’t know
if this precise attack has occurred, but analogous intersec-
tions of hotel guest lists, IP Addresses, and e-mail accounts
revealed the parties in the Petraeus/Broadwell scandal [47].
As a step toward addressing such risks we present Bud-
dies, the first anonymous communication architecture de-
signed to protect users systematically from long-term inter-
section attacks. Buddies works by continuously maintaining
an anonymized database of participating users and their on-
line status, and uses this information to simulate intersec-
tion attacks that a network-monitoring adversary might per-
form. These simulations yield two relevant anonymity met-
rics that Buddies reports continuously, as an indication of
potential vulnerability to intersection attack: a possibilistic
metric roughly measuring“plausible deniability,”and a more
conservative indistinguishability metric indicating vulnera-
bility to more powerful statistical disclosure attacks [16].
Beyond just measuring vulnerability, as in prior work on
metrics [17,43] and alternate forms of anonymity [30], Bud-
dies offers active control over anonymity loss under intersec-
tion attack. Users specify a policy for each pseudonym that
balances attack protection against communication respon-
siveness and availability. To enforce these policies, a policy
module monitors and filters the set of users participating
in each communication round, sometimes forcing the sys-
tem to behave as if certain online users were actually offline.
Through this active control mechanism, policies can enforce
lower bounds on anonymity metrics, preventing Alice from
revealing herself to Mallory by posting at the wrong time for
example. Policies can also reduce the rate of anonymity loss
to intersection attacks, for example by tolerating anonym-
ity set members who are normally reliable and continuously
online but who lose connectivity for brief periods. Finally,
policies can adjust posting rates or periods, enabling Bud-
dies to aggregate all users coming online within a posting
period into larger anonymity sets. If Alice sets her blog’s
posting period to once per day, for example, then Buddies
Figure 1: Conceptual model of Buddies architecture
can maintain Alice’s anonymity among all users who “check
in” at least once a day—any time during each day—even if
many users check in only briefly at widely varying times.
Buddies’ architecture may be treated as an extension to
various existing anonymous communication schemes, but is
most well-suited to schemes already offering measurable pro-
tection guarantees against traffic analyis, such as MIX cas-
cades [5, 41], DC-nets [9, 46, 52], or verifiable shuffles [7, 25,
39]. We have built a working prototype of Buddies atop Dis-
sent [11,13,52], a recent anonymous communication system
that combines verifiable shuffle and DC-net techniques. The
prototype’s design addresses several practical challenges: to
decentralize trust among independent servers, to create and
manage pseudonyms while maintaining their independence,
and to support user-selectable policies for each pseudonym.
To evaluate Buddies’ practicality in realistic online com-
munities, we analyze IRC trace data under a Buddies sim-
ulator, exploring questions such as how effective Buddies’
anonymity metrics are, how feasible it may be to maintain
nontrivial anonymity sets resistant to intersection attacks
for extended periods, and how effectively Buddies can limit
loss of anonymity while preserving usable levels of commu-
nication responsiveness and availability.
This paper’s primary contributions are: (a) the first ano-
nymity architecture that systematically addresses intersec-
tion attacks; (b) a modular, policy-based framework for both
vulnerability monitoring and active mitigation of anonymity
loss via intersection attacks; and (c) an evaluation of Bud-
dies’ practicality via a working prototype and trace-based
simulations reflecting realistic online communities.
Section 2 of this paper outlines Buddies’ high-level model
of operation and the anonymity metrics we use. Section 3
then explores several useful attack mitigation policies in this
model. Section 4 details challenges and approaches to in-
corporating Buddies into practical anonymity systems, and
Section 5 experimentally evaluates both our working Bud-
dies prototype and trace-based simulations. Section 6 sum-
marizes related work, and Section 7 concludes.
2. BUDDIES ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 shows a high-level conceptual model of the Bud-
dies architecture. Buddies assumes there is some set of users,
each of whom has a secret (i.e., securely encrypted) network
communication path to a component we call the Anonym-
izer. For now we conceptually treat the Anonymizer as a
central, trusted “black box,” although later we will map this
conceptually centralized component to realistic anonymiza-
tion systems that decentralized trust, to avoid trusting any
single physical component or administrative domain.
Buddies’ model is inspired by anonymous blogging or IRC
scenarios, where users post messages to a public forum, and
users primarily desire sender anonymity [40]. While we ex-
pect Buddies to generalize to two-way models and met-
rics [44], we defer such extensions to future work. Each Bud-
dies user “owns” some number of Nyms, each representing a
pseudonymous identity under which the owner may post:
e.g., an anonymous chat handle or blog. Users may secretly
submit messages to be posted to Nyms they own, which the
Anonymizer scrubs of identifying information and publicly
“posts” to that Nym. To make various operational decisions,
the Anonymizer consults a Policy Oracle. By design the Pol-
icy Oracle has no access to sensitive information, such as who
owns each Nym: the Policy Oracle makes decisions based
purely on public information available to anyone.
We assume the network-monitoring adversary identifies
users by some network identifier or locator, such as IP ad-
dress. By monitoring these locators the adversary can tell
which users are online or offline at any given moment, and
how much data they transmit or receive, but cannot see
the actual content of data communicated between honest
users and the Anonymizer. These assumptions model an
ISP-grade adversary that can implement“wholesale”network-
level monitoring of users connected via that ISP.
2.1 Overview of Operation
In Buddies’ conceptual architecture, communication pro-
ceeds synchronously through a series of rounds. The Ano-
nymizer drives the operation of each round i, as follows:
1. Registration: At the start of round i the Anonymizer
updates the membership roster,Mi, to include members who
may have recently joined.
2. Nym creation: The Anonymizer next creates and an-
nounces one “fresh”Nym Ni each round. For each new Nym,
the Anonymizer chooses one User uniformly at random as
the Nym’s owner, keeping this ownership secret. A Nym’s
lifetime is in principle unlimited: over time users acquire
fresh Nyms at random but “statistically fair” times. (We
later address creation of larger “batches” of Nyms efficiently,
so new users need not wait a long time before they can post.)
3. Scheduling: The Anonymizer consults the Policy Or-
acle to choose one Nym, Ti, for transmission in this round,
from all Nyms in existence. The Policy Oracle also specifies
the number of bits Bi that the owner of Nym Ti may post.
(Scheduling multiple Nyms per round is a straightforward
extension.) As the Policy Oracle can access only public infor-
mation, scheduling cannot depend directly on which Users
currently “have messages to post.” Scheduling can depend
on other factors, however, such as Nyms’ lifetimes, recent
usage, or the interest of other users as indicated in messages
previously posted anonymously via other Nyms.
4. Message submission: The Anonymizer announces
the scheduled Nym Ti and transmission length Bi to the
Users currently online. Each online user submits exactly Bi
secret bits to the Anonymizer. These secret bits may con-
tain either “real” data, or a null message of Bi zero bits, if
the user has nothing useful to transmit at the moment. The
bits sent from any user j other than the owner of Nym Ti
represent “cover traffic” necessary to hide the Nym-owner’s
message submission from traffic analysis. The Anonymizer
forms an online user set, Oi ⊆ Mi, consisting of the users
who submitted a (real, null, or cover) message in round i.
5. User filtering: The Anonymizer now consults with
the Policy Oracle, giving the Policy Oracle the set Oi of
online users—but not any message content or information
about which, if any, of these users owns the Nym scheduled
this round. The Policy Oracle returns a new, filtered user set
Pi ⊂ Oi, further constraining the set of online users whose
submissions the Anonymizer will actually accept this round.
6. Message posting: If the owner of the scheduled Nym
Ti is a member of Pi—i.e., is online and was not filtered
above—then the Anonymizer decrypts that user’s secret mes-
sage and posts it in association with Nym Ti. If the owner of
Ti is not in Pi—either because the owner was not online or
was filtered above—then the Anonymizer posts Bi zero bits
to Nym Ti: an output indistinguishable from a null message.
2.2 Active Mitigation of Intersection Attacks
The user filtering step above (step 5) serves as Buddies’
primary “control point” through which to resist intersection
attacks. The Policy Oracle uses publicly available informa-
tion to simulate a virtual Adversary, by continuously per-
forming an “intersection attack” against each Nym. At step
5 of each round i, the Policy Oracle first forms an attack
model for the scheduled Nym Ti, based on prior history and
the set Oi of users online in this round. The Policy Oracle
computes one or more relevant anonymity metrics as de-
tailed further below, and determines if action is required to
limit or avoid anonymity loss in this round. If no action is
required, the Policy Oracle returns the unfiltered user set
to the Anonymizer, i.e., Pi = Oi. If action is required, how-
ever, then the Policy Oracle can filter the user set producing
a Pi ⊂ Oi, thus preventing any user not in Pi from posting,
as if more users were offline than are actually offline.
To illustrate how this filtering enables the Policy Oracle to
mitigate intersection attacks, consider the following straw-
man policy. In step 5 of each round, the Policy Oracle sim-
ply checks whether all known users are presently online, i.e.,
whether Oi = Mi, returning Pi = Mi if so, and otherwise
returning Pi = ∅. In effect, the Policy Oracle forbids the sys-
tem from making progress—allowing anyone to post to any
Nym—except when all users are online. Since messages are
posted only when all users are online, the intersection of all
nonempty rounds’ user sets is Mi, and the system preserves
“perfect” anonymity assuming the Anonymizer performs as
required. The tradeoff, of course, is effective system availabil-
ity, which would be unusable in most practical situations.
The key technical challenge, and a primary contribution
of this paper, is developing more nuanced methods of con-
trolling the user filtering step in each round. By controlling
these filtering choices, we seek to maintain both measurable
anonymity levels under intersection attack and “usable” lev-
els of availability, under arguably realistic conditions.
There are situations in which no active control mechanism
will help. If all users but one go offline permanently, for ex-
ample, the Policy Oracle has only two choices: eventually
allow the one remaining user to post, giving up all ano-
nymity under intersection attack; or filter that user forever,
giving up availability completely. Thus, we must set realistic
expectations. Section 5 experimentally investigates the fea-
sibility of resisting intersection attacks in IRC communities,
and tests possible control policies against feasibility metrics.
Buddies’ architecture separates the Policy Oracle from the
Anonymizer, giving the Policy Oracle access only to “pub-
lic information” we assume is known to everyone including
the adversary, eliminating the risk that policies may “acci-
dentally”compromise anonymity by leaking Nym ownership.
By architecturally disallowing the Policy Oracle from hav-
ing access to private information, we avoid the need to ana-
lyze each policy carefully for such “side-channel” anonymity
leaks, and instead can focus purely on the main question of
how effectively a policy mitigates intersection attacks while
maintaining usable levels of availability.
Another issue is whether the information the Policy Ora-
cle needs to simulate the Adversary’s intersection attacks—
such as the set of users online in each round—should be
considered “public information.” Although an ideal global
adversary would know this information anyway, more re-
alistic adversaries may be unable to monitor all users. If
Buddies’ design “hands out” information that would other-
wise be at least partially private—such as the IP addresses
of all online users—we risk accidentally “strengthening” a
weak adversary into an effectively omniscient adversary. In
the important case of users’ network identities such as IP
addresses, our design mitigates this leak by replacing IP ad-
dresses with anonymized tags when reporting online user
sets to the Policy Oracle, as discussed in Section 4.3. How-
ever, whether Buddies’ simulation-based architecture may
strengthen weak adversaries in other unexpected ways, by
making “too much information” public, merits further study.
2.3 Analyzing Intersection Attacks
While we do not attempt full formal analysis, the sim-
plicity of the conceptual model facilitates straightforward
informal analysis. Our focus here is on a particular class of
attacks, namely what an adversary can learn from users’ on-
line status over time (the “switches” in Figure 1). The many
other known attacks against practical anonymity systems
are important but out of this paper’s scope. We also claim
no particular novelty in our analysis techniques or metrics;
our goal is merely to apply known attacks [16, 31, 42] and
anonymity metrics [17,43] to the Buddies model.
We assume the Anonymizer is trusted to“do its job,”keep-
ing secret the linkage between Users and the Nyms they own.
We also assume honest Users—those users we care about
protecting—do not “give away” their identities or the rela-
tionships between their Nyms via the messages they post.
Under these conditions, the Adversary obtains three po-
tentially important pieces of information in each round i:
(a) the set of online users Oi, (b) the set Pi of online users
who passed the Policy Oracle’s filter in step 5, and (c) the
Bi message bits that were posted to the scheduled Nym Ti.
An observation that will be key to Buddies’s design is that
only (b) and (c) will actually prove relevant to intersection
attack analysis: the adversary ultimately obtains no useful
information from knowing which users were online during a
given round, beyond what the adversary learns from know-
ing which users were online and unfiltered.
Since we assume honest users do not “give away” their
identities in their message content, we ultimately care only
whether the message posted to Nym Ti was null or non-null.
If a non-null message appeared for Nym Ti in round i, then
the adversary infers that the owner of Ti must be a member
of the filtered user set Pi in that round. (If the owner of Ti
was online but filtered in round i, then a null message would
have appeared, as if the owner was offline.)
If a null message appears for Ti, however, the Anonym-
izer’s design ensures that the adversary cannot distinguish
among the following three possibilities: (1) the owner of Nym
Ti was offline, (2) the owner was online but filtered, or (3)
the owner was online and unfiltered, but had nothing useful
to send and thus intentionally posted a null message.
2.3.1 Possibilistic Anonymity Analysis
To construct a simple possibilistic anonymity set PN for a
given Nym N , the adversary intersects the filtered user sets
Pi across all rounds i for which Nym N was scheduled and
a non-null message appeared: i.e., PN =
⋂
i
{Oi | Ti = N ∧
mi 6= 0}. Thus, PN represents the set of users who might
conceivably own Nym N , consistent with the observed set
of non-null messages that have appeared for Nym N up to
any point in time. Since the adversary cannot distinguish
whether the appearance of a null message means that N ’s
owner was offline, filtered, or merely had nothing to send,
null-message rounds do not eliminate the possibility that
users offline during that round may own N , so such rounds
leave the possibilistic anonymity set PN unaffected.
We define the size of a Nym’s possibilistic anonymity set,
|PN |, as Nym N ’s possibilistic anonymity, which for conve-
nience we abbreviate as possinymity. Although possinymity
is only one of the many useful anonymity metrics that have
been proposed [32, 33], and perhaps a simplistic one, we
feel it captures a useful measure of “plausible deniability.”
If for example a user is dragged into court, and the judge is
shown network traces of a Buddies system in which the ac-
cused is one of |PN | users who may in principle have posted
an offending message, then a large possibilistic anonymity
may help sow uncertainty of the user’s guilt. We fully ac-
knowledge the weaknesses of plausible deniability in gen-
eral, however, especially in environments where “innocent
until proven guilty” is not the operative principle.
2.3.2 Probabilistic Anonymity Analysis
While a simplistic adversary might stop at the above anal-
ysis, a smarter adversary can probabilistically learn not only
from rounds in which non-null messages appeared, but also
from rounds in which only a null message appeared.
Suppose for example the adversary correctly surmises from
past observation that, in each round i, the owner of Nym N
will have no useful message to post with some independent
and uniformly random probability p. In this case the user
will “pass” by submitting a null message. With probability
1 − p the user will have a non-null message and will try to
post it—but this post attempt fails, yielding a null message
anyway, if the owner is offline or filtered in that round.
For simplicity assume there are two users A and B, the
adversary observes exactly one round i, this round results in
a null message, and Pi = {A}: user A participated but user
B did not. The null output from round i means one of two
events occurred: (a) A owns N , but chose with probability
p not to post in round i; or (b) B owns N , and no message
appeared independently of p because B 6∈ Pi. Because Nyms
are assigned to users uniformly at random on creation, the
“base” probability that either user owns N is 1/2. The prob-
ability of the above events (a) and (b) occurring conditioned
on the observed history, however, is different. To be pre-
cise, P [(a) | (a) ∪ (b)] = P [(a) ∩ ((a) ∪ (b))]/P [(a) ∪ (b)] =
(p/2)/P [(a)∪(b)], and P [(b) | (a)∪(b)] = (1/2)/P [(a)∪(b)].
Since (a) and (b) are disjoint events, P [(a)∪ (b)] = P [(a)]+
P [(b)], so P [(a)] = (p/2)/(p/2 + 1/2) = p/(p + 1), and
P [(b)] = (1/2)/(p/2 + 1/2) = 1/(p+ 1).
From the adversary’s perspective, observing one round in
which no message appears for Nym N , and in which A par-
ticipated but B did not, reduces the relative likelihood of A
being the owner by a factor of p. Observing similar events
across multiple rounds exponentially increases the adver-
sary’s “certainty” of B being the owner: after k such rounds,
the likelihood of A being the owner is only pk/(pk + 1).
2.3.3 Indistinguishability Under Probabilistic Attack
The above reasoning generalizes to many users, varying
probabilities of posting, etc. Our focus is not on deepening
such analysis, however, a goal admirably addressed in prior
work [17, 43]. Instead, we wish to achieve measurable resis-
tance to unknown probabilistic attacks: we do not know the
probabilities with which users will attempt to post in par-
ticular rounds, how well the unknown attacker may be able
to predict when the owner of a given Nym will post, etc.
Instead of relying on the relevance of any particular proba-
bilistic analysis—which may break each time a known attack
is refined—Buddies relies on an indistinguishability principle
that applies to all attacks of this class. If two users A and B
have exhibited identical histories with respect to inclusion in
each round’s filtered user set Pi, across all rounds i in which
a Nym N was scheduled so far, then under any probabilistic
analysis of the above form the adversary must assign identi-
cal probabilities to A and B owning Nym N . That is, if for
every round i, it holds that (A ∈ Pi) ⇐⇒ (B ∈ Pi), then
users A and B are probabilistically indistinguishable from
each other, hence equally likely to own Nym N .
For any user A and Nym N , we define A’s buddy set
BN (A) as the set of users probabilistically indistinguish-
able from A, including A itself, with respect to potential
ownership of Nym N . If n users are probabilistically indis-
tinguishable from A, then under the attacker’s analysis each
such user in BN (A) has an individual probability no greater
than 1/|BN (A)| of being the owner of N . Intuitively, buddy-
sets form equivalence classes of users who “hang together”
against probabilistic intersection attacks—so that individual
buddies do not “hang separately.”
We next define a second anonymity metric, indistinguisha-
bility set size, or indinymity for short, as the size of the
smallest buddy-set for a given Nym N . Since we do not
know how a real attacker will actually assign probabilities
to users, indinymity represents the minimum level of ano-
nymity a member of any buddy set can expect to retain,
even if the adversary correctly intersects the owner’s ano-
nymity set down to the members of that buddy set. Thus,
the attacker cannot (correctly) assign a probability greater
than 1/|BN | to any user—including, but not limited to, the
owner of N .
One might argue that we “mainly” care about the buddy
set containing the true owner of N , not about other buddy
sets not containing the owner. A counter-argument, however,
is that a particular observation history might make some
other buddy set falsely appear to the adversary as “more
likely” to own N . In this case, we may well care how much
protection the innocent members of that “unlucky” buddy
set have against being “falsely accused” of owning N . Thus,
to ensure that all users have the “strength in numbers” of
being indistinguishable in a crowd of at least n users, re-
gardless of the adversary’s probabilistic reasoning, we must
ensure that all buddy sets have size at least n.
3. ATTACK MITIGATION POLICIES
Based on the above architecture, we now explore possible
intersection attack mitigation policies. We make no claim
that these are the“right”policies, merely a starting point for
ongoing refinement. Two key benefits of Buddies’ architec-
ture, however, are to modularize these policies into replace-
able components independent of the rest of the anonymous
communication system so they can be further evolved easily,
and to ensure by system construction that policies cannot
leak sensitive information other than by failing to protect
adequately against intersection attacks.
We first explore policies for maintaining possinymity, then
policies to enforce a lower bound on indinymity. An impor-
tant caveat with any anonymity metric is that Buddies can-
not guarantee that measured anonymity necessarily repre-
sents useful anonymity, if for example an attacker can com-
promise many users or create many Sybil identities [19]. Sec-
tion 4.4 discusses these issues in more detail.
3.1 Maximizing Possinymity
The possinymity metric defined in Section 2.3.1 considers
only rounds in which non-null messages appear for some
Nym N , intersecting the filtered user sets across all such
rounds to determine N ’s possinymity set PN . We consider
several relevant goals: maintaining a minimum possinymity
level, mitigating the rate of possinymity loss, or both.
Maintaining a Possinymity Threshold.
Suppose a dissident, posting anonymously in a public chat
room under a Nym N , wishes to maintain “plausible denia-
bility” by ensuring that |PN | ≥ 100 throughout the conver-
sation—and would rather be abruptly disconnected from the
conversation (or have Nym N effectively “squelched”) than
risk |PN | going below this threshold. As a straightforward
policy for this case, at step 5 of each round i, the Policy Or-
acle computes the new possinymity that N would have if Oi
is intersected with N ’s “running” possinymity set from the
prior round. The Policy Oracle returns Pi = Oi if the new
possinymity remains above threshold, or Pi = ∅ otherwise.
In practice, the effect is that N ’s possinymity starts out
at an initial maximum of the total set of users online when
the user first posts via N , then decreases down to (but not
below) the possinymity threshold as other users go offline,
either temporarily or permanently. This policy has the ad-
vantage of not reducing the usability of N , or artificially
delaying the time at which the user’s posts appear, as long
as the possinymity set remains above-threshold. Once N ’s
possinymity set reaches the set threshold, however, all of
the users remaining in this set become critical, in that N
becomes unusable for posting once any remaining member
goes offline. In the“dissident scenario”we envision this event
might be the user’s signal to move to a new network location:
e.g., get a fresh IP address at a different Internet cafe.
Limiting Possinymity Loss Rate.
An alternative, or complementary, goal is to reduce the
rate at which N ’s possinymity decreases. In realistic scenar-
ios, as our trace data in Section 5 illustrates, clients often get
delayed or disconnected temporarily but return soon there-
after. Thus, a more refined policy might temporarily halt all
posting for Nym N—by returning Pi = ∅—when members
of N ’s current possinymity set go offline, in hopes that the
missing members will soon return. To ensure progress and
get N “unstuck” if members remain offline for a sufficient
number of rounds, however, the policy eliminates these per-
sistently offline members from N ’s permanent possinymity
set by returning a smaller (but nonempty) Pi. Such a pol-
icy may “filter out” possinymity set losses due to otherwise-
reliable users going offline briefly, at the cost of delaying a
user’s posting to Nym N for a few rounds if some current
possinymity set member goes offline permanently. Of course,
a loss rate limiting policy may readily be combined with
a threshold-maintaining policy of the form above. A fur-
ther refinement of this combination might be to increase the
loss limiting policy’s “tolerance”—number of rounds a user
may remain offline before being eliminated—as the Nym’s
possinymity set size falls to approach the user’s specified
lower bound. Such a policy in essence trades more tempo-
rary unavailability for greater total Nym longevity.
Users Worth Waiting For.
While the above simple variants suggest starting points,
we envision many ways to refine policies further, for example
by recognizing that a user’s record of past reliability is often
a predictor of future reliability. To maximize a Nym N ’s
possinymity and minimize anonymity loss rate, while also
limiting delays caused by unreliable users, we may wish to
consider some members of N ’s current possinymity set to be
“more valuable” than others: e.g., users who have remained
online and participating reliably for a long period with at
most a few brief offline periods. In particular, a policy might
apply an offline-time threshold as discussed above to limit
loss rate, but apply different thresholds to different members
of N ’s current possinymity set, giving longer, more generous
thresholds to more “valued” users.
The Policy Oracle can build up reliability information
about users starting when those users first appear—not just
when a particular pseudonym of interest is created. Thus,
a policy that Buddies applies to a particular Nym N can
benefit from user history state that the Policy Oracle may
have built up since long before N was created.
3.2 Guaranteeing Minimum Indinymity
The possinymity metric considers intersection attacks only
across rounds in which non-null messages appear, but in
realistic chat or blogging scenarios a user’s posts will be
interspersed with idle periods during which no message ap-
pears. A smarter adversary can use the predictive techniques
discussed in Section 2.3.2 to glean probabilistic information
from such rounds. We therefore wish to guarantee users some
level of indinymity, even under probabilistic attacks.
Forming and Enforcing Buddy-Sets.
To guarantee a NymN will have a minimum indinymity of
some value K, the Policy Oracle must ensure that all of N ’s
buddy-sets—subsets of users whose members exhibit iden-
tical online behavior across rounds after user filtering—are
all of size at least K. As a straw-man approach to buddy-
set formation, on the creation of Nym N , the Policy Oracle
could divide N ’s initial user rosterM into ⌊|M|/K⌋ arbitrary
buddy-sets “up-front,” each containing at least K users. At
step 5 of each round i, for each buddy-set B containing any
offline user u 6∈ Oi, the Policy Oracle removes all mem-
bers of u’s buddy set B from its filtered user set Pi. The
Policy Oracle effectively forces members of each buddy set
to come online or go offline “in unison,” keeping them per-
manently indistinguishable under probabilistic intersection
attack (even if the adversary can distinguish one buddy set
from another). This straw-man policy is likely to yield poor
availability, however, as it prevents N ’s owner from posting
whenever any member of the owner’s buddy-set is offline,
making N unusable in the fairly likely event that any mem-
ber of this buddy set is unreliable or disappears permanently.
Lazy Buddy-Set Formation.
As a first refinement, therefore, the Policy Oracle can de-
lay buddy-set decisions until users actually go offline. At cre-
ation, a Nym N starts with one large buddy-set containing
its entire user roster M. In the first round i in which mem-
ber(s) of M go offline, the Policy Oracle might first delay all
posting for Nym N by returning Pi = ∅, in hopes the miss-
ing member(s) will return online soon, as discussed above.
Once the Policy Oracle “gives up” on one or more members,
however, it splits N ’s current buddy-sets into two, isolat-
ing all persistently offline members into one of the resulting
buddy-sets. By delaying the decision of how to split buddy-
sets, the Policy Oracle guarantees that after the split-point,
the buddy-set containing only online members will have a
chance to “make progress”—at least until more users go of-
fline for sufficiently long to force another buddy set split.
After a split, each of of the resulting buddy-sets must be
at least of size K to maintain an indinymity lower bound. If
fewer than K total users are actually offline (|M−Oi| < K),
then the Policy Oracle must “sacrifice” a few online users,
placing them in the offline users’ buddy-set. Otherwise, if
for example a single offline user forcing a split is actually the
owner of Nym N , then placing the offline user in a buddy
set of size 1 would quickly reveal to a probabilistic attacker
that the now-offline user owned the pseudonym, once the
attacker notices that posts have stopped appearing on Nym
N . By “sacrificing”K− 1 additional users at the split point,
even if the attacker infers from the absence of posts that
N ’s owner is in the now-offline buddy-set, he cannot tell
whether the owner is the user who caused the split, or is one
of those sacrificed and forced offline to “keep him company.”
If the offline users in a buddy set eventually return online,
then the whole buddy set rejoins in unison, making the Nym
usable again if the owner was a member of this buddy set.
Choosing Whom to Sacrifice.
When the Policy Oracle must “sacrifice” online users to
pad an offline buddy set to size K, an important issue is how
to choose which online users to sacrifice. We investigated two
classes of sacrificial policies: random, and least reliable users.
Random choice clusters users into buddy sets regardless of
reliability, which is simple but risks sacrificing reliable users
by mixing them into buddy sets containing unreliable or
permanently offline users. Alternatively, the Policy Oracle
might first sacrifice users with the weakest historical record
of reliability: e.g., users who arrived recently or exhibited
long offline periods. By this heuristic we hope to retain the
most reliable users in the buddy set that remains online
immediately after the split—though this buddy set may split
further if more nodes go offline in the future.
We expect reliability-sensitive policies to maximize a Nym’s
effective lifetime, provided the Nym’s true owner is one of the
more reliable users and does not get sacrificed into an un-
reliable or permanently offline buddy set. A short-lived or
unreliable user cannot expect his Nyms to be long-lived in
any case: a long-lived Nym must have a “base” of reliable,
long-lived users to maintain anonymity under intersection
attack, and the Nym’s owner must obviously be a member
of the long-lived anonymity set he wishes to “hide in.”
3.3 Varying Policies and Nym Independence
So far we have assumed the Policy Oracle enforces a“global
policy” on all Nyms, but this would limit flexibility and per-
haps unrealistically require all users to “agree on” one pol-
icy. Instead, Buddies allows each Nym to have a separate
policy—e.g., different lower bounds and anonymity loss mit-
igation tradeoffs—chosen by the Nym’s owner.
Since intersection attacks are by definition not an issue
until a Nym N has been in use for more than one round,
N ’s owner specifies the policy parameters for a Nym N in
its first post toN . The set of users online in this first message
round, in which N ’s policy is set, formsN ’s initial user roster
M, which is also by definition the maximum anonymity set
N can ever achieve under intersection attack. In subsequent
rounds in which Nym N is scheduled, the announced policy
for N determines the Policy Oracle’s behavior in filtering
N ’s user sets to mitigate intersection attacks.
Each Nym’s policy is thus independent of other Nyms—
including other Nyms owned by the same user. This policy
independence, and the correctness of Section 2’s analysis,
depend on the assumption made in Section 2.1 that the An-
onymizer assigns Nyms to users uniformly at random and
independent of all other Nyms. Otherwise, the choices the
Policy Oracle makes on behalf of one Nym might well leak
information about other Nyms. This leads to some specific
design challenges addressed below in Section 4.2.
To illustrate the importance of independent Nym assign-
ment, suppose there are two users, to whom the Anonymizer
non-independently issues two Nyms N1 and N2, via a ran-
dom 1-to-1 permutation—always giving each user exactly
one Nym. In the first communication round, N1’s owner an-
nounces a weak policy with a minimum buddy set size of 1,
but N2 demands a buddy set size of 2. The adversary later
sees a non-null post to N1 while user B is offline, and as N1’s
weak policy permits, infers that A must own N1. If each user
owns exactly one Nym, then the adversary can also infer that
B must own N2, violating N2’s stronger policy. With inde-
pendent Nym assignment, in contrast, the knowledge that
A owns N1 gives the adversary no information about which
user owns N2, because it is just as likely that A owns both
N1 and N2, as it is that each user owns exactly one Nym.
4. BUDDIES IN PRACTICAL SYSTEMS
Since Buddies’ conceptual model in Section 2 is unrealisti-
cally simple in several ways, we now address key challenges
of implementing Buddies in practical anonymity systems.
For concreteness we will focus on the design of our Buddies
prototype built as an extension to Dissent [11, 13, 52], but
we also discuss the Buddies architecture’s potential applica-
bility to other existing anonymous communication systems.
4.1 Decentralizing the Anonymizer
So far we have treated the Anonymizer as a trusted“black
box” component, but in a practical anonymity system we do
not wish to require users to trust any single component.
In a practical design, therefore, we replace Buddies’ Ano-
nymizer with one of the standard decentralized schemes for
anonymous message transmission, such as mix-nets [6,8,15],
DC-nets [9,50], or verifiable shuffles [7,25,39].
While agnostic in principle to specific anonymous com-
munication mechanisms, Buddies makes two important as-
sumptions about the Anonymizer’s design. First, Buddies
assumes the Anonymizer is already resistant to basic, short-
term network-level traffic analysis and timing attacks [34,38,
45]. Without basic traffic analysis protection necessary for
unlinkable message traffic, we cannot expect to achieve reli-
able long-term protection for linkable posts via pseudonyms.
Second, we assume the Anonymizer distributes trust across
some group of servers, and that there exists at least one
trustworthy server in this group—although the user need not
know which server is trustworthy. This anytrust model [51] is
already embodied in the relays used in mix-nets or Tor cir-
cuits [18], the“authorities”assumed in verifiable shuffles [39],
or Dissent’s multi-provider cloud model [52].
While “ad hoc” mix-nets and onion routing schemes are
vulnerable to many traffic analysis and active attacks, vari-
ants such as MIX cascades [5,7,41] and verifiable shuffles [25,
39] offer formally provable traffic analysis resistance. These
systems typically work in synchronous rounds, where users
submit onion-encrypted ciphertexts to a common set of mixes,
who serially decrypt and permute the ciphertexts to reveal
the anonymous plaintexts. To resist traffic analysis, users
with no useful message to send in a round must submit en-
crypted “empty”messages as cover traffic.
DC-nets [9, 50] similarly operate in synchronous rounds,
but derive anonymity from parallel information coding tech-
niques rather than serial mixing, achieving traffic analy-
sis protection in fewer communication hops. Dissent [11,13,
52] adapts DC-nets to a practical and scalable client-server
model. By leveraging the parallel communication structure
of DC-nets, Dissent achieves per-round latencies orders of
magnitudes lower than a verifiable shuffle or cascade mix
guaranteeing equivalent security. Dissent thus forms a nat-
ural foundation for our Buddies prototype to build on.
4.2 Creating and Extending Nyms
Buddies can conveniently represent Nyms as public/private
key pairs, so that anyone may learn the public keys of all
Nyms in existence, but only a Nym’s owner holds the cor-
responding private key. Dissent runs Neff’s verifiable key-
shuffle [39], once per communication epoch, to generate a list
of public keys forming a DC-nets transmission schedule for
that epoch. Each client submits one public key to the shuf-
fle, which the servers re-encrypt and randomly permute, to
produce a well-known list of slot keys. The client holding a
slot’s matching key can identify its own slot, but neither the
servers nor other clients learn who owns any honest client’s
slot. Adapting this mechanism to create fresh Nyms in Bud-
dies introduces two further technical challenges: assigning
Nyms to users independently at random, and enabling Nyms
to have unlimited lifetimes.
Creating Nyms via Lotteries.
A simple way to create independent Nyms meeting the
requirements in Section 3.3 is by “lottery.” Each user sub-
mits a fresh public key to a verifiable shuffle, the servers
jointly pick one re-encrypted key at random from the shuf-
fled output to be a new Nym, and discard all other keys.
For efficiency, we would prefer to generate fresh Nyms in
batches, amortizing the cost of the shuffle across lotteries
for many Nyms, while ensuring that each Nym is assigned
independently. One conceivable approach is for the servers
to mint a batch of e-cash “coins” [10], encrypt each coin to a
random key chosen from the shuffle’s output, and finally run
a verifiable DC-nets round [13, 27], with one slot per coin,
allowing each coin’s “winner” to spend the coin and publish
a fresh public Nym key. We leave detailed exploration of this
challenge to future work.
Extending Nyms Across Epochs.
To enable Nyms to persist beyond one epoch, clients can
use each winning ticket from a Nym lottery either to publish
a fresh Nym key, or to re-publish an old Nym key, effectively
“reviving” the old Nym and giving it a transmission slot in
the new epoch. A lottery winner might even publish another
user’s public Nym key, effectively delegating the winning
ticket’s share of bandwidth in the new epoch an arbitrary
Nym whose content the lottery winner finds interesting.
When a client revives its own Nym in a new epoch, the
client must ensure that the set of users participating in the
Nym lottery is consistent with the existing Nym’s anonymity
policy: e.g., that the user’s buddies are also online. If some
participants go offline during a Nym lottery, to avoid policy-
checking races the servers must restart the lottery, enabling
clients to re-check the new participant set before exposing
an old Nym in the new epoch.
4.3 Implementing the Policy Oracle
Implementing the Policy Oracle as a single independent
server would require that all clients trust the Policy Oracle
server to implement their requested attack mitigation poli-
cies correctly. Although a bad Policy Oracle server cannot
directly de-anonymize users since it does not know which
users own each Nym, it could—by intent or negligence—
simply make intersection attacks easy. For this reason, Bud-
dies leverages the anytrust server model that the underlying
Anonymizer already uses, running a virtual replica of the
Policy Oracle in “lock-step” on each of the anonymization
servers. The servers use standard distributed accountabil-
ity techniques [28] to cross-check each others’ computation
of Policy Oracle decisions, halting progress and raising an
alarm if any server deviates from an agreed-upon determin-
istic algorithm implementing the Policy Oracle. These tech-
niques apply readily to the Policy Oracle precisely because
it architecturally has access to no sensitive state, and hence
all of its state may be safely replicated.
Identifying Users to the Policy Oracle.
Buddies’ Anonymizer shares the set of users currently on-
line in each round with the Policy Oracle, which implies that
we must treat these online sets as “public information” that
the adversary may also obtain. As discussed in Section 2.2,
however, revealing actual user identities or locators for this
purpose, such as users’ public keys or IP addresses, risks
strengthening a weak adversary into an “omniscient” adver-
sary for intersection attack purposes.
Buddies addresses this problem by permitting clients to
authenticate with the servers via linkable ring signatures [24,
35]. To connect, each client generates a cryptographic proof
that it holds the private key corresponding to one of a ring
of public keys, without revealing which key the client holds.
In addition, the client generates and proves the correctness
of a linkage tag, which has a 1-to-1 relationship with the
client’s private key, but is cryptographically unlinkable to
any of the public keys without knowledge of the correspond-
ing private keys. The servers track which clients are online
via their linkage tags, and provide only the list of online
tags to the Policy Oracle in each round, so the Policy Ora-
cle can simulate an adversary’s intersection attacks without
knowing which actual users are online each round.
Of course, the server that a client connects to directly
can associate the client’s network-level IP address with its
linkage tag, and a compromised server may share this infor-
mation with an adversary. This linkage information does not
help a global passive adversary, who by definition obtains all
the same information the Policy Oracle obtains merely by
monitoring the network, but may help weaker adversaries
perform intersection attacks against those users who con-
nect via compromised servers. We see this risk as equivalent
to the risk clients run of connecting to a compromised “entry
relay” in existing anonymity systems [15,18]. Compromised
servers are just one of the many avenues through which we
must assume an adversary might monitor the network.
4.4 Malicious Users and Sybil Attacks
While Buddies can measure, and optionally enforce a lower
bound on, the number of users comprising a Nym’s possi-
nymity or indinymity set, Buddies cannot guarantee that all
those users are providing useful anonymity. In particular,
if the owner of a Nym N has specified a policy mandating
a minimum buddy-set size of K, but up to F other clients
may be colluding with the adversary, then N ’s owner may
have to assume that its actual minimum anonymity set size
may be as little as K − F , if all F bad clients happen to—
or somehow arrange to—land in the same buddy set as N ’s
owner. Since in practical systems we don’t expect users to
have a reliable way of “knowing” how many other clients are
conspiring against them, we treat F as an unknown variable
that users may simply have to “guess” and factor into their
choices of possinymity or indinymity lower-bounds. In this
respect Buddies is no different from any other anonymity
system some of whose users may be compromised.
Reducing vulnerability to malicious clients may be an ar-
gument in favor of random buddy-set formation (Section 3.2).
Randomized policies may offer some guarantee that the ma-
licious users present in a Nym’s initial user set become“evenly
distributed” among buddy-sets. In any preferential, “repu-
tation-based” formation scheme, if the attacker can learn or
correctly guess the general “level of reliability” of a Nym N ’s
true owner—which may well be inferable from N ’s posting
record—then the attacker’s compromised nodes might delib-
erately exhibit a similar level of reliability in hopes of getting
clustered together in the owner’s buddy set. For such attacks
to succeed, however, the malicious users must be present at
N ’s creation in order to fall in N ’s possinymity set in the
first place, and the attacker must adjust their reliability pro-
file after learning “enough” about N ’s owner, but before too
many buddy set splits have already occurred for N . Thus, if
the Policy Oracle builds up user reputation information in a
relatively conservative, long-term fashion across the users’
entire histories (e.g., from before N appeared), this may
make it difficult for an attacker to “steer” malicious users’
reliability profiles “late in the game” to implement a cluster
attack N . Clustering attacks nevertheless present a risk that
more randomized buddy set formation policies may reduce.
As in any distributed system, an attacker may be able to
amplify the effective numbers of malicious clients via Sybil
attacks [19], creating many fake user identities. Buddies ad-
dresses this risk by requiring users to be authenticated—
via linkable ring signatures as detailed above—as owners of
“real” identities in some Sybil attack resistant identity space.
Buddies is agnostic as to the exact nature of this public iden-
tity space or how it is made resistant to Sybil attacks. The
current prototype simply is defined for “closed” groups, de-
fined by a static roster of public keys listing all members,
so the group is exactly as Sybil attack resistant as whatever
method the group’s creater uses to form the roster. To sup-
port open-ended groups, Buddies could build on one of the
many Sybil attack resistance schemes, such as those based
on social networks [48,54]—or could simply rate-limit Sybil
attacks via some “barrier to entry,” e.g., requiring users to
solve a CAPTCHA or receive a phone callback to “register”
an unknown public key for participation.
5. EVALUATION
We now evaluate Buddies’ utility, using data we collected
from popular public IRC (Internet Relay Chat) chat rooms
on EFnet servers. After introducing our data collection and
simulation approach, we first explore “ideal” metrics quanti-
fying levels of anonymity achievable in principle under given
conditions—metrics that depend only on the user behavior
dataset and not on any particular Buddies policy or loss mit-
igation algorithm. Next, we apply these traces to an event-
based Buddies simulator to evaluate more realistic policies
against these ideals. We consider na¨ıve anonymous posting
without Buddies, then posting under policies that enforce
minimum buddy-set sizes, and policies that attempt to maxi-
mize possinymity. Finally, we analyze the overheads Buddies
induces in the context of Dissent.
5.1 Datasets and Simulation Methodology
To evaluate Buddies’ utility, we use traces taken from
popular public IRC (Internet Relay Chat) chat rooms on
EFnet servers. Unlike web traffic [53], IRC logs record par-
ticipants online status in addition to activity or transmission
of messages. The online status becomes critical for systems
in which inactive but online users submit cover traffic, such
as Buddies assumes. While BitTorrent traffic [2] supports
similar conventions as IRC, online status and activity, user
behavior focuses transferring data between peers, which does
not make a strong correlation to the need for long term in-
tersection resistant Nyms. Furthermore, the buddy system
focuses on anonymous group communication systems that
reveal all anonymous cleartexts to all users with at least all
servers privy to the input; such behavior maps better to IRC
and BitTorrent traffic than to Web traffic.
We monitored 100 (a limitation imposed by EFnet) of
the most active EFnet-based IRC rooms, for over a month
dating from November 26th through December 30th, 2012.
For each room, we obtained the following for each member:
joins, leaves, nickname changes, and messages. Anecdotally,
we found that users often temporarily disconnect from IRC
without IRC recognizing the disconnection. This creates a
period of time in which the user must use a secondary nick-
name, then switch back to the original nickname once IRC
recognizes the disconnect. Unfortunately we have no statis-
tics on average disconnection time, but we were able to iden-
tify these scenarios and “fix” the data such that the affected
users appear to be continuously online.
Figure 2 visually illustrates the trace collected from one
sample IRC room, football, plotting the time period a given
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Figure 2: Visualization of user online periods over one month in EFnet’s football IRC chatroom.
user was online as a horizontal line. Figure 2(a) sorts the
1207 unique users observed during the trace vertically by
total time the user was online during the observation period.
This graph shows that the online forum has a “core” set of
around 300 users who stay online most of the time, while the
remaining users come online for shorter periods at varying
times, with denser vertical stripes showing periodic patterns
(e.g., football games). Figure 2(b) shows the same data
with users sorted by first appearance online: again about
300 users were online already at the start of the trace, while
new users appear subsequently at a fairly constant rate—
with a fraction of these “late arrivals” remaining online for
the remaining trace period.
To analyze this data we implemented an event-driven Bud-
dies simulator in Python, cleverly called the Anonymity Sim-
ulator (AS). AS plays the role of users, the Anonymizer,
and the Policy Oracle. As input the AS takes an IRC trace,
time between rounds, system-wide buddy and possinymity
set sizes, and buddy set formation policies. We primarily fo-
cus on random buddy set formation policies and user online
times. For the latter, the AS can either use an initial pe-
riod of the trace, a bootstrap period, or use a deity mode
and review the entire data set. To better compare apples-to-
apples, random, bootstrapped, and deity mode evaluations
all began at the same time in the trace.
5.2 Ideal Anonymity Analysis
We first use our IRC traces to explore upper bounds on
the anonymity we expect to be achievable in any system
resistant to intersection attacks, under a trace-driven sce-
nario, but independent of particular anonymity mechanisms
or policies. These experiments depend only on analysis of
the IRC data, and do not depend on Buddies’ design or the
Buddies simulator. This analysis serves to deepen our un-
derstanding of user behavior in realistic online forums, and
to establish realistic expectations of what a system such as
Buddies might achieve in principle. We first consider ano-
nymity potentially achievable for low-latency communica-
tion using pseudonyms of varying lifetimes, then focus on
long-lived pseudonyms in communication scenarios that can
tolerate varying offline times in members of anonymity sets.
Low-latency pseudonyms of varying lifetime.
We focus on the football dataset, considering all online
periods of all 1207 users appearing in the trace as visualized
in Figure 2. We treat each contiguous online period lasting
at least time x as representing a pseudonym with lifetime
x, and compute an ideal anonymity set for that pseudonym
as the total number of users also contiguously online dur-
ing that pseudonym’s lifetime. This analysis pessimistically
eliminates from the anonymity set users with any offline pe-
riod, however brief, during the pseudonym’s lifetime.
Figure 3(a) summarizes the distribution of these ideal an-
onymity set sizes, for pseudonym lifetimes varying on the
log-scale x-axis. Pseudonyms used for up to about one hour
reliably achieve anonymity sets of at least 250 members, and
sometimes up to 375 members—between 20% and 30% of the
total user population observed—suggesting that substantial
resistance to intersection attack may be achievable in large
forums for short-lived pseudonyms. Achievable anonymity
under these assumptions falls off rapidly as pseudonym life-
time increases further, however.
Long-lived pseudonyms tolerant of offline periods.
Applications that demand truly long-lived pseudonyms,
such as blogs, can often tolerate longer communication la-
tencies. Many anonymous communication schemes can ag-
gregate user behavior into selectable time periods, such as
batches in mix-nets [8,15], or dropoff windows in DC-net sys-
tems such as BlogDrop [12] or Verdict [13]. Users who come
online and participate at any time during each window are
indistinguishable to the adversary, enabling the system to
tolerate users who go offline briefly for periods shorter than
that window. Buddies policies can similarly be configured to
tolerate users who go offline for brief periods without ano-
nymity loss, as discussed in Section 3.1. In all these cases, the
main cost is to increase communication latency up to that
offline tolerance period. Without focusing on any particu-
lar mechanism, we now parameterize our ideal anonymity
analysis on the assumption that a long-lived pseudonym has
some way to tolerate users who go offline for periods up to
a varying maximum offline time.
Figure 3(b) shows the ideal anonymity achievable for a
hypothetical long-lived pseudonym whose lifetime is the en-
tire 1-month observation period of the IRC trace, assum-
ing that pseudonym can tolerate a varying maximum of-
fline time shown on the log-scale x-axis. Since this scenario
gives us only one “data point” per IRC trace for a given
maximum offline period, the figure shows the same analy-
sis for several different IRC datasets. Consistent with the
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(a) Ideal anonymity set size potentially achievable by a low-
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tolerate no offline time in members of its anonymity set.
(b) Ideal anonymity potentially achievable for long-lived (1-
month) pseudonyms, tolerating anonymity set members who
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Figure 3: Analysis of ideal anonymity potentially achievable based on user behavior in the IRC football room.
right edge of Figure 3(a), long-lived pseudonyms that can-
not tolerate even short offline periods—as required for low-
latency communication—achieve small anonymity sets con-
sisting of only the 10–30 users in each trace who were contin-
uously throughout the trace. (The leftmost portion of this
graph may be optimistic, in fact, as the IRC server may
not have logged temporary network disconnections shorter
than the TCP timeout of around 30 seconds.) A long-lived
pseudonym that can tolerate disconnections up to one hour,
however, can achieve 100-user anonymity sets across the 1-
month trace in the football and iphone rooms. A pseudo-
nym that can tolerate 1-day disconnections—realistic for a
blog whose author posts at most once per day anyway—can
achieve still larger anonymity sets of around 200 users, or
6% of the football group’s total observed membership.
In general, the IRC datasets exhibit a common pattern
where a small set of dedicated users is almost always online,
a larger set–roughly 15% to 20%–who show up about once
an hour to once a day, and a large set of ephemeral users
comprise around 80% of the total population. We do not ex-
pect ephemeral users to contribute usefully to the anonymity
sets of long-lived Nyms, but it is important for Buddies to
operate in their presence, and ephemeral users can increase
anonymity for short-lived Nyms as Figure 3(a) shows.
5.3 Possinymity Analysis and Enforcement
We now explore the behavior of Buddies’ possibilistic an-
onymity metric, as defined in Section 2.3.1, under our IRC
trace workloads. While the above ideal anonymity analysis
generically explored the levels of anonymity a “hypothetical”
pseudonym might achieve, we now wish to use our traces to
model specific pseudonyms and explore their behavior under
specific Buddies policies. To do so, we consider the messages
posted by each IRC user to represent one pseudonym in our
model, we take the times these IRC messages appeared to
represent a “schedule” of the times the modeled pseudonym
owner had a message to post, and we define the nominal life-
time of each modeled pseudonym as the time from the first
message to the last message. We then replay this activity un-
der AS, the Anonymity Simulator, to evaluate the behavior
of Buddies’ metrics under these activity traces, and the ef-
fect of Buddies policies on actual communication behavior,
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Figure 4: Evolution of worst-case possinymity over trace
taking into account the (sometimes indefinite) delays that
Buddies sometimes imposes to preserve anonymity.
Figure 4 shows how possinymity evolves across the life-
times of pseudonyms with 1-second round times (no offline
time tolerance). The x-axis represents time since since each
pseudonym’s inception—i.e., from its first scheduled mes-
sage. The y-axis value of the solid lines show minimum or
worst-case possinymity across all pseudonyms whose life-
times extend at least to that point. Each line color in the
graph reflects behavior under Buddies policy that enforces
a different possinymity lower bound, whose enforced level is
represented by the corresponding horizontal dotted line.
Consistent with our expectations from Figures 2 and 3(a),
possinymity starts at the number of users online at time of
first post, and gradually decreases as users “churn” offline
and get intersected out of the pseudonym’s possinymity set
at a relatively constant rate. In practice, enforcing a lower
bound leaves pseudonyms’ behavior unaffected until just be-
fore a message post would decrease the pseudonym’s possi-
nymity below the lower bound. At this point the pseudonym
becomes unable to post—i.e., Buddies deliberately compro-
mises availability to preserve anonymity—leaving possinym-
ity constant after that point in the trace.
5.4 Indinymity Analysis and Buddy Sets
We now explore probabilistic attacks of the form discussed
in Section 2.3.2, and Buddies’ ability to protect users against
such attacks via buddy sets. To validate the protection Bud-
dies provides, we model one particular probabilistic inter-
section attack, in which the attacker observes the messages
posted by a pseudonym, assumes the owner decided whether
to post in each round with a fixed, independent probability
p, and uses the analysis outlined in Section 2.3.2 to divide
users into classes based on likeliness of owning the pseudo-
nym. The attacker then makes a “best guess” at which user
owns that pseudonym, and we compute the attacker’s chance
of guessing correctly: 1/k if the owner is within the k-user
equivalence class the attacker judges most likely, and 0 if not.
We make no claim that this particular attack is representa-
tive of the attacks most likely to be mounted by real-world
adversaries, but merely use it as an example to test and
visualize the effectiveness of buddy sets. We reiterate that
Buddies’ security is based ultimately not on knowledge or
expectations of particular attacks, but on an indistinguisha-
bility principle that applies to all probabilistic attacks using
observed online/offline behavior as inputs.
Figure 5 shows pseudonyms’ measured worst-case ano-
nymity under this probabilistic attack, again as a function
of the length of time each pseudonym has been active. Each
line color represents a different buddy set size enforcement
policy, with dotted lines representing effective anonymity
against the probabilistic guessing attack, solid lines rep-
resenting measured possinymity for reference, and dashed
lines representing the buddy set size—and hence indinymity
lower bound—enforced by the respective policy. Note that
these graphs have logarithmic x-axes, unlike Figure 4. While
possinymity decreases at a relatively constant rate with user
churn, the probabilistic attack is much faster—effectively
eliminating the vast majority of an unprotected user’s ini-
tial anonymity set within the first hour since a pseudonym
starts posting, for example. Nevertheless, for a given en-
forced buddy set size, the probabilistic attack only approach-
es, but never violates, the enforced indinymity bound.
5.5 Effect on Usable Pseudonym Lifetime
While the above experiments validate Buddies’ effective-
ness at mitigating anonymity loss through both possibilistic
and probabilistic intersection attacks, this security neces-
sarily comes with usability tradeoffs. Buddies policies may
make a pseudonym unusable for posting messages before the
owner naturally finishes using the pseudonym, and in still
usable pseudonyms, messages may be delayed.
To explore Buddies’ effect on pseudonym usability, Fig-
ure 6 contains CDFs showing the distributions of useful life-
times of pseudonyms under various enforced buddy set sizes.
As the relevant comparison baseline, the black line repre-
senting the nominal case shows the distribution of pseudo-
nym lifetimes in the IRC trace without any Buddies policy.
We take this line to represent the distribution of time peri-
ods during which traced users intended to use a pseudonym
to post messages. Each colored line in contrast shows the
distribution of actual, useful pseudonym lifetimes upon en-
forcing a given enforced buddy set size.
For many pseudonyms, unfortunately, resistance to prob-
abilistic intersection attack comes at a high cost. As Fig-
ure 6(a) shows, for example, 50% of the pseudonyms mod-
eled in the trace have nominal lifetimes of at least one day—
meaning that their owners “would like to” use them for one
day—but under enforced buddy set sizes of 32 or more,
50% of pseudonyms remain usable only for about an hour
under Buddies. Some pseudonyms remain usable for much
longer even under Buddies, however: in particular, those
pseudonyms whose owners are long-lived and fall into the
same buddy set with other long-lived, reliable users.
For each buddy set size, the graph additionally contrasts
two schemes for dividing users into buddy sets. The Or-
acle scheme “sorts” users into buddy sets based on their
maximum offline time, as measured for Figure 3(b), thereby
clustering users with similar reliability levels together from
the perspective of an oracle who can “see” into the future.
The dotted lines, for comparison, reflect a more realistic,
dynamic scheme designed along the lines discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2. This scheme clusters users into buddy sets dynam-
ically based only on recent past reliability history, up to to
the point in time when a large buddy set must be subdivided
in order to keep a pseudonym usable. Since past reliability
is not a perfect predictor of future reliability, the realistic,
dynamic scheme incurs some further loss of effective pseu-
donym lifetime. The current dynamic scheme is simplistic
and can likely be improved, so we expect the utility actually
achievable in practical systems to lie somewhere between the
respective solid and dotted lines.
5.6 Effect on Pseudonym Messaging Delay
Finally, for messages that users successfully transmit via
pseudonyms under various enforced buddy set sizes, Figure 7
shows the distribution of artificial delays that Buddies im-
poses on those message transmissions to preserve indinymity.
Unsurprisingly, the percentage of messages experiencing de-
lays increases with buddy set size, since any pseudonym’s
owner must effectively wait to post until all her buddies are
also online, and large buddy sets increase the likelihood of
some buddy being offline at the time of a desired message
transmission. When a message is delayed, unfortunately, it
is commonly delayed by at least one hour, and under large
buddy set sizes often by a day or more. This result further
confirms our intuition that long-term resistance to proba-
bilistic intersection attacks in dynamic networks may really
be feasible only for delay-tolerant transmission.
We contrast the messaging delays experienced under the
two buddy set formation schemes above: one based on an
oracle’s perspective of users’ long-term reliability, the other
based on a more realistic dynamic algorithm. In this case,
we find somewhat surprisingly that the dynamic scheme ac-
tually delays substantially fewer messages than the oracle
scheme. This is because the oracle scheme sorts buddies into
sets based only on global reliability measured over the entire
trace, and may inappropriately group together users who
were online for similar durations but at different times. As
the dynamic scheme builds buddy sets using recent infor-
mation localized in time, it better groups ephemeral users
who are online at similar times. Neither of these buddy set
formation schemes are likely to be close to optimal, and we
consider improving them to be a useful area for future work.
5.7 Practical Considerations
The integration of Buddies into Dissent sheds light into
both the overheads of Buddies in a real system and the im-
plementation complexities that Buddies induces. We built
both Buddies and a web service for querying the various
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Figure 5: Measured worst-case anonymity loss over time under one example probabilistic intersection attack.
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Figure 6: CDFs showing distributions of pseudonym lifetimes, with and without indinymity enforcement via buddy sets.
Buddies meters and we modified Dissent [52] to 1) support
the reactive and proactive analysis in the anonymity proto-
col and 2) transmit the set of online members (those with
ciphertexts used in Dissent) along with the cleartext mes-
sages at the end of each round. Buddies totaled 528 lines
of C++ code, while Dissent incurred only 41 lines of ad-
ditional C++ code. Included within the 528 lines of C++
code, Buddies comes with both a static and dynamic policy
each weighing in at 89 and 172 lines of code, respectively.
In Dissent, the buddy set concept applied cleanly; how-
ever, in the current Dissent implementation, the mainte-
nance of possinymity is not ideal. While DC-nets theoret-
ically allow serial processing of anonymous cleartexts allow-
ing finer grained control over possinymity, currently, Dis-
sent servers perform the cleartext revealing process for all
scheduled Nyms in parallel, which limits possinymity evalu-
ations to occur only before processing the first anonymous
cleartext. Performing the operation iteratively would require
adding additional interaction among the servers, potentially
adding significant overhead. Overhead would be negligible
only for rounds with interval time t in which there were
m scheduled Nyms with inter-server network latency of l,
where m × l ≪ t. Fortunately, the Dissent implementation
does support scheduling Nyms during different intervals, and
therefore Buddies can still make both possinymity and in-
dinymity sets largely independent for different Nyms.
Using our Dissent implementation of Buddies, we focused
evaluations on the additional delay added by Buddies. We
constructed a network of 8 server machines, 64 client ma-
chines, and from 8 to 512 clients (running up to 8 clients
on each client machine). Clients have a 50 millisecond delay
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Figure 8: The overhead of using Buddies in Dissent.
and aggregate 100 M/bit connection to servers, while servers
have a 10 millisecond delay to other servers, but each has
a dedicated 100 M/bit connection to every other server. To
focus on the overheads Buddies incurs, we avoided sending
anonymous plaintexts across Dissent, The results, shown in
Figure 8, indicate that Buddies imposes negligible overhead
over Dissent—within measurement error—because perfor-
mance costs are dominated by the expensive asymmetric
cryptography used in signing and verifying messages.
6. RELATED WORK
The utility of pseudonyms has been well-recognized since
Chaum’s seminal paper on mix networks [8]. Pseudonymity
has motivated much work in anonymous authentication [36]
and signature schemes [24,35]. One way to protect distribut
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Figure 7: CDFs showing distributions of delays imposed on successfully transmitted messages under Buddies.
systems from Sybil attacks [19] is to build online pseudonyms
atop “real-world” identities [22]. None of these approaches
protect a pseudonym’s owner from being traced via network
monitoring, however. We concur with recent proposals to
integrate pseudonymity into network architecture [29], al-
though this gateway-based proposal unfortunately has the
same “single point of failure” weakness as a conventional
single-hop proxy or commercial VPN service [1].
Multi-hop mix networks [15] and onion routing systems [18]
address this single point of failure, but remain vulnerable to
many traffic analysis attacks. Pseudonymous communica-
tion is by now well-known to be highly vulnerable to long-
term intersection attacks [31,42], later strengthened into sta-
tistical disclosure attacks [16, 37, 53]. Padding communica-
tions to a constant rate with dummy traffic [4,6,14,23] can
slow—but not stop—passive intersection attacks [37].
Padding may not even slow active attacks, however, where
an attacker deliberately perturbs performance to trace a cir-
cuit [20,38,45]. Active attacks are eminently realistic, being
already widely used for Internet censorship [26, 49], for ex-
ample. Buddies is the only architecture we are aware of that
addresses both passive and active intersection attacks, by
“collectivizing” the anonymizer’s control plane logic into a
Policy Oracle component that cannot see—and thus can-
not leak—sensitive information (Section 2), even when repli-
cated for accountability (Section 4.3). This architecture en-
sures that Buddies’ attack mitigation policies apply regard-
less of whether clients churn“normally,” or are forced to slow
or go offline due to deliberate denial-of-service.
The Java Anonymous Proxy [3] incorporates an“Anonym-
O-Meter” [21], to give users an indication of their current
anonymity level. This meter does not address intersection
attacks, but serves as a precedent for Buddies’ computation
and reporting of possinymity and indinymity metrics.
Prior systems also protect anonymity within well-defined
groups. Tarzan [23] organizes an overlay of mimics, where
each user maintains constant cover traffic with k other mim-
ics to mitigate traffic analysis attacks. Systems based on
DC-nets [9], such as Herbivore [46] and earlier versions of
Dissent [11, 13, 52], achieve provable traffic analysis resis-
tance for unlinkable messages in a single communication
round. Since every group member typically knows the on-
line status of every other, however, linkable transmissions
using pseudonyms can make such systems more vulnerable
to intersection attack than“amorphous”systems such as Tor.
Buddies addresses this risk by using linkable ring signatures
to authenticate and “tag” users (Section 4.3).
Hopper and Vasserman [30] establish anonymity among
sets of k members in a mix, similar to buddy sets, and ex-
plore the resistance of these k-anonymity sets to statistical
disclosure attacks. Buddies builds on this approach to of-
fer users dynamic anonymity monitoring and active controls
over tradeoffs between anonymity and performance. Aqua [6]
uses padded, multipath onion routing to achieve efficiency
and reduce vulnerability to traffic analysis. We expect Bud-
dies be synergistic with designs like Aqua’s, by providing a
stronger and more controllable notion of intersection attack
resistance than currently provided by Aqua’s k-sets.
7. CONCLUSION
Buddies offers the first systematic architecture address-
ing long-term intersection attacks in anonymity systems, by
offering passive metrics of vulnerability and active control
policies. While only a first step leaving many open ques-
tions, our trace-based simulations and working prototype
suggest that Buddies may point to practical ways of further
protecting anonymity-sensitive users of online forums.
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